

WAS THERE AN IONIAN REVOLT?

The events in Ionia during the first decade of the fifth century have been the subject of perennial controversy, largely because of the deficiencies of the account Herodotus gives us. The nature of these deficiencies, however, has for the most part been ignored, and the debate has centred itself on what we should add to and subtract from the account of Herodotus. Such an approach is dangerously subjective, and tends to produce an account of the 'Revolt' untenable in the light of our evidence. It would be very satisfying to prove that 'widespread hatred of a despotic constitution' indicates that 'Ionia was seething with discontent', causing 'the Ionians' great struggle for freedom, undertaken of their own free will';¹ can we justify such conclusions from the evidence?

The answer is clearly no. Herodotus is our only reliable authority, and such is decidedly not the picture he paints. Critics have thus had to resort to reasoning like this: 'Herodotus fails to do justice to the Ionians' great bid for freedom; ergo, he is clearly biased against the Ionians in general and the "Revolt" in particular; ergo, he must be deliberately excluding vital information; ergo, we must supply that missing information.' This has led to numerous reconstructions, mainly based upon the presupposition that the Ionian 'Revolt' was a trial run for at least the Persian Wars, if not the American War of Independence too. I would prefer to begin by questioning the original assumptions: (a) was Herodotus biased against the Ionians and/or their 'Revolt'? and (b) are we to assume that he therefore deliberately slanted his account against them and/or it? Only then will it be possible to define Herodotus' views on the 'Revolt', and to ask what modifications need to be made.

A thorough examination of Herodotus' evidence about the Ionians is necessary if we are to form a balanced view of the historian's attitudes to them: to base our assessments upon the comments he makes in the section on the 'Revolt' alone is as misleading as it would be to assess Shakespeare by the evidence of *Henry VI* alone, or Wagner on the evidence of only the orchestral excerpts familiar to the concert-goer. I propose therefore to look first at his comments on the Ionians before and after the 'Revolt', then his comments upon the 'Revolt', before trying to form any assessment of his attitudes.

IONIA BEFORE THE 'REVOLT'

From scattered references throughout the earlier part of Herodotus' work (viz. before 5.28), three factors emerge which are of fundamental importance to any understanding of Herodotus' attitudes to the Ionians.

1. *Disunity*. At the outset of his description of the colonization of Ionia (1.146) Herodotus stresses the diverse origins of the Ionians and their consequent disunity, referring back to this diversity of origin both in the same section (1.149) and at points later in the work (e.g. speech of Leotychidas 6.86a; further origins for the colonists are given in 7.95 and 9.26). Criticism² has tended to

¹ Quotations from J. B. Bury, *History of Greece*² (London, 1951), p. 243; A. R. Burn, *Persia and the Greeks* (London, 1962), p. 193; and How and Wells: *Commentary on Hdt.*² (Oxford, 1928), on 6.3.
² e.g. J. M. Cook, *The Greeks in Ionia* (Thames & Hudson, 1962); O. Sakellariou, *La Migration grecque en Ionia* (1958).

concentrate upon the accuracy of Herodotus' account of the origins: my purpose here is not to add to that discussion, but to underline the point that, accurate in detail or not, the historian was undoubtedly right in stressing the diverse origins of the settlers, itself a fact that would make disunity highly probable.

That there was considerable diversity of outlook was apparent to Herodotus from the information he collected: only the Chians helped Miletus against Sadyattes (1.18); Miletus alone concluded an alliance with Cyrus, although all tried to do so (1.141); and Phocaea and Teos alone preferred voluntary exile to submission to Harpagus (1.168–9). While all Ionians may have met at the Panionium, it would thus be erroneous to conclude that a united policy was there agreed upon which all delegates unanimously adopted.³ Diversity of origin was clearly followed by political disunity.

Herodotus knew of at least three attempts to unite Ionia, all of which failed: those of Bias and Thales (1.170), and that of Hecataeus later (5.36). Further, Herodotus clearly approved of these proposals: Bias' attempt is described as *γνώμη χρησιμωτάτη*, that of Thales *χρηστή*. Additionally, he states his belief that a united Ionia could have been the most prosperous part of Greece (1.170), and elsewhere he implies that unity is essential to prosperity (5.3).

We must therefore conclude that for Herodotus Ionia was 'merely a geographical description' (as Metternich said of Italy): it had a common council, but the states had very different origins, acted independently and resisted unification.

2. *Weakness*. Arising from this inherent disunity was the logical corollary, that Ionia itself was weak. This conclusion is implicit in the references already quoted (1.170, and 5.3—of the Thracians, but stated as a general principle), and explicit in 1.143, where he records that at this time (sc. second half of the sixth century) Ionia was the weakest of the Greek states. In earlier times, we may note that prosperity was vested not so much in Ionia as in its constituent states—Miletus and Chios, for example (1.17–22), or Naxos (5.28). In so far as Ionia was weak, even the name Ionian became a derogatory comment (1.143)—which it still was at the time of the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 5.9.1, 6.77.1, 8.25.3).

While Herodotus avoids the outright damnation of Thucydides' speakers, he clearly saw Ionian weakness as a result of disunity.

3. *'Where East meets West'*. A vital factor about Ionia was its geographical situation: Herodotus clearly saw it as a very significant area in which Greek and Eastern influences met—and clashed: it was almost the Alsace–Lorraine of the ancient world, territory over which there were frequent disputes between more powerful neighbours. Indeed, the Ionians are involved in all the major actions in Herodotus, from the rise of Lydia to their liberation after Mycale. Immerwahr⁴

³ The statement in How and Wells (on 1.148) is quite untrue: 'We have instances of united action in 1.141, 5.108.2, 6.7.' Not one helps their argument: in 1.141, Miletus is outside the terms of reference, having made her private peace with Cyrus; and in both 5.108 and 6.7, the issue is the 'Revolt' itself, which we shall see to have had no unity of aim or action. Attempts to prove greater unity from electrum coins (P. Gardner: *JHS* 31, 1911) cannot *prove* unity (see Myres: *Hdt., Father of History* (Oxford, 1953),

p. 197). On the other hand, Lieselotte Solmsen (*AJPh* 64 (1943), 194–207) concluded from a careful study of the speeches in this section that 'the Ionians' lack of judgment, training and unity—defects which not even the greatest heroism could offset—caused the rebellion's failure.' Not, of course, that any of the states displayed 'the greatest heroism'—so far as we can *prove*.

⁴ H. R. Immerwahr, *Form and Thought in Hdt.* (Cleveland, 1966), p. 233.

sees them as 'a major unifying factor in the Histories', in their pattern of history from freedom through various subjugations to freedom once again—a pattern which Herodotus himself stresses (1.27, 169; 6.32; 9.104).

4. Miscellaneous information which Herodotus gives about Ionia includes the facts that he liked the climate (1.142), that the Ionians named the crocodile (2.69) and helped build the splendid temple known as the Hellenium (2.178). Additionally, Herodotus imputes to Cleisthenes contempt for the Ionians (5.69)—but 'whatever it [sc. *ὑπεριδῶν Ἴωνας*] means, [it] does not imply that Herodotus shared the prejudice he attributes to Cleisthenes.'⁵

IONIA AFTER THE 'REVOLT'

Little comment is needed here. We learn that the Ionians served with Darius against Eretria (6.98), and that Mardonius was later rather contemptuous of them (7.9a), although tacitly corrected by the more careful assessment of Artabanus (7.10c), and indeed they could provide valuable information on local deities needing placation to allay a storm (8.191). During the battle of Artemisium, some Ionians were pro-Athenian (8.10), prompting Themistocles to carve messages on the rocks for their benefit (22), and after the battle several of the Ionian states supplied ships for the Greek fleet (46). Those who fought with Xerxes earned his admiration for their bravery despite Phoenician suspicion (90), which Xerxes himself later shared (99). After Salamis, the Ionians joined the Greeks and fought with such loyalty that the Greeks seriously proposed the evacuation of Ionia for fear of reprisals against allies of Greece (9.106), especially in view of their renewed rebellion (104)—when the wheel had come full circle and Ionia was once more independent of Persia.

It is thus apparent that neither in the account of Ionia before the 'Revolt' nor in the narrative of Ionian participation in the Persian Wars does Herodotus display any antipathy to the Ionians in general. The nearest the historian gets to uttering any criticism at all is in implying that the Ionians could have achieved greater prosperity by closer unity and more concerted action. It should perhaps be stressed that in using the term 'the Ionians'—as Herodotus does—we must be aware that the expression is as purely geographical as (say) 'the South Sea Islanders' is to us; and further, that in employing the phrase 'the Ionian Revolt'—which Herodotus never does⁶—we are using an even more misleading label. For Herodotus, we may be confident from a close examination of the text, there never was any such thing as the 'Ionian Revolt'.

Before proceeding to examine the account of the 'Revolt', we may perhaps conclude by invoking one of Fornara's criteria of bias: 'Only clear signs that he overrated it [for our purposes, read 'underrated the Ionians'] consistently would suggest partiality on his part',⁷ viz. bias against the Ionians. There are no such clear signs: we have information favourable and less favourable presented with

⁵ B. M. Mitchell, 'Hdt. and Samos' (*JHS* 95 (1975), 89 n. 65); cf. Myres (op. cit., pp. 181–2) who makes Hdt. 'deliberately ironical' with 'more than Sophoclean irony', and C. W. Fornara (*Hdt., An interpretative Essay* (Oxford, 1971), p. 55) who describes Hdt. as being 'irreverent . . . and, by implication, cynical'.

⁶ The nearest Hdt. comes to referring to an Ionian 'Revolt' is 9.105: τὸ δεύτερον ἀπέστη, implying an earlier ἀπόστασις. I am indebted to Professor A. A. Long for pointing this out.

⁷ Fornara, op. cit., p. 54; actually on Hdt. on Periclean Athens, but equally relevant here.

candid impartiality. There never was bias against the Ionians in general: did he acquire bias against their 'Revolt' in particular, and then equally suddenly shed it?

IONIA DURING THE 'REVOLT'

That Herodotus was strongly biased against the Ionians in general (which we have seen to have no foundation) and the 'Revolt' in particular is so universally accepted⁸ that it is seldom thought necessary even to glance at the evidence of the text. In fact, the evidence is extremely slender, and depends upon three main factors:

1. several references to the 'Revolt' using the term *κακά*: *ἀνεσις κακῶν* and *κακά* in the next clause (5.28); *ἀρχὴ κακῶν* (5.97.3); and *κακὸν τοσοῦτον* (6.3).
2. the use of *διαβάλλειν* in 5.97.2.
3. Herodotus' supposed bias against Histiaeus and Aristagoras.

Not one of these factors need indicate that Herodotus was biased against the Ionians—unless we approach the text with a mind already determined to find such bias.

1. To use the references employing the word *κακά* as evidence of Herodotus' bias, we must assume that *κακά* must imply something morally evil. Such an assumption ignores three vital facts: (a) both the adjective *κακός* and the noun *κακόν* are used frequently for describing general hardships, not necessarily moral viciousness; (b) in 5.97.2, the full phrase reads 'the beginning of evils *for Greeks and foreigners alike*', where *κακά* must be taken as referring to general hardships; since the other usages are similar, it would be reasonable to assume that they all should be interpreted in this way; (c) the phrase *ἀρχέκακος* is certainly Homeric (*Iliad* 5.63), and may even have been proverbial—Thucydides relates an anecdote in which the Spartan herald Melesipus used the same phrase (2.12.3). Wars bring distress and disasters upon both or all the combatants, as Herodotus was well aware: to make him imply moral judgements by his use of the term *κακά* is to distort the text unreasonably.

2. The usage here has certainly provoked controversy: does it necessarily lead to the conclusion that Herodotus was biased? For How and Wells, of course, it does—bias against the Ionians in favour of the Athenians; yet it is interesting that Fornara⁹ takes the same reference as indicating partly a general hatred of war and partly anti-Athenian, pro-Spartan prejudice. The pacifist element has also been noted by Strasburger, who concludes that Herodotus deliberately stopped his work before the rise of the Athenian Empire for the same reason, that he was caustically critical of Athenian democracy—a conclusion challenged by Harvey, who takes this phrase as a 'paradoxical witticism' prompted by bias against the revolt.¹⁰

What precisely does Herodotus mean or imply here?

One point that I believe has eluded all the commentators is precisely what Aristagoras requested from the Athenians, according to Herodotus' information. He reports that Aristagoras said the same at Athens as at Sparta, viz. proposing a

⁸ e.g. L. Basch (in *JHS* 97 (1977), 7):
'... même en tenant compte de la malignitas
d'Hérodote à l'égard des Ioniens'.

⁹ Fornara, op. cit., pp. 76 n. 4 and 50.

¹⁰ H. Strasburger, 'Herodot und das
perikleische Athen' (*Historia* 4 (1955), 1–25);
F. D. Harvey, 'The Political Sympathies of
Hdt.' (*Historia* 15 (1966), 254–5).

full-scale invasion of Persia, 5.49–50, with the additional plea that the Milesians were Athenian colonists, and in his desperation offering wild promises, until he convinced them. Now if Herodotus and his sources really believed that Aristagoras informed the Athenians that ‘they would easily achieve mastery over all Asia without effort’ (5.49.8—to Cleomenes, but the same was said at Athens, 5.97.1), and the Athenians really were convinced that they could do this with just twenty ships and no separate land forces, then the usage of *διαβάλλειν* seems far too mild for such a preposterous resolution!

We may thus reasonably doubt the accuracy of Herodotus’ information here—did Aristagoras really suggest a full-scale attempt upon the Persian Empire? and did the Athenians volunteer assistance for such an attempt? What we cannot accept is that the conclusion Herodotus draws, from the facts as best he was able to ascertain them, displays any bias whatever: it is eminently reasonable.

3. That Herodotus was biased against both Histiaeus and Aristagoras is generally discredited now. From Herodotus’ account, it is difficult to see either man as more than a political opportunist with few (if any) scruples; for this he was duly excoriated by How and Wells, who seem to have seen both as clear-sighted democratic zealots nobly endeavouring to unburden Ionia from oppressive tyranny. Admittedly, Grundy dissented from this view and saw Histiaeus as a self-centred turncoat; many scholars would now accept this judgement of both Histiaeus and Aristagoras,¹¹ amply justifying Herodotus’ own character analysis (one of extremely few that Herodotus ever makes) of the latter as *ψυχὴν οὐκ ἄκρος* (5.124).¹² We may well conclude with Andrewes:¹³ ‘Histiaeus and Aristagoras were accomplished opportunists, ready to improve their fortunes with Persian help while it lasted, or to turn their hand against the Persian if it seemed more profitable.’

THE ‘REVOLT’ ITSELF

The narrative of the rebellion (5.28–6.34) is interrupted by three major digressions, on Spartan history (5.39–48), the Royal Road (5.52–4), and Athenian history (5.56–96). If we exclude these, we are left with an account of the outbreak of hostilities and of the preparations (5.28–37), some aspects of its course, including the careers of Histiaeus and Aristagoras (5.99–6.21) and finally the outcome (6.22–41). There are great deficiencies in the account: we are nowhere told exactly who was fighting, or precisely why; we have no detailed survey of the progress of the ‘Revolt’; there are no military details included. These deficiencies, it has been largely taken for granted, Herodotus chose to omit because he wished to belittle the Ionians and their ‘Revolt’: if we deny ourselves the curt carp of bias (which we have no right to presuppose without any adequate evidence), we must look more closely at the text to find some alternative explanation—based upon facts, not presupposition.

As we have already seen, Herodotus viewed the Ionians as disunited, and this

¹¹ e.g. G. A. Chapman, ‘Hdt. and Histiaeus’ role in the Ionian Revolt’ (*Historia* 21 (1972), 567); A. Andrewes, *The Greek Tyrants* (London, 1956), p. 124; P. B. Manville, ‘Aristagoras and Histiaeus’ (*CQ* (1977), 91). Also W. G. Forrest, ‘Motivation in Hdt.’ (PCPS, forthcoming 1979). I am very grateful to Professor Forrest for allowing me to see this article before its publication.

¹² As K. H. Waters, ‘Hdt. on tyrants and Despots’ (*Historia Einzelschr.* 15 (1971), 35–6).

¹³ A. Andrewes, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

disunity is everywhere apparent in his account of the 'Revolt': Aristagoras tried to get all the Ionian states to rebel, but only some states seem to have done (5.37). After the successful raid on Sardis—and perhaps despite the setback at Ephesus (102) and the Athenian desertion (103)—other states joined in; but even as late as the battle of Lade there would appear to have been little consultation among the states, in that the mission of the tyrants was considered by each a deputation to that state alone (6.10). Further, even those states who were involved objected to discipline and training (6.12), provoking disorder and leading to the defection of one state (Samos, 6.13). Of the twelve Ionian cities (1.142), not all took part: Colophon and Lebedos are nowhere mentioned, the role of Clazomenae is unclear (it was recaptured by Artaphrenes and Otanes, 5.123), and Ephesus clearly kept aloof from the struggle altogether. Additionally, the rebellion was by no means a purely Ionian venture: Lesbos contributed seventy ships (6.8), Cyprus played a conspicuous role (5.104–16), the Carians joined in (5.117–21), and many others assisted—Cyme (5.38), Mytilene (38–9), Caunus and others (103). Rhodes may have done so, but evidence is doubtful, and Herodotus himself cannot help here.¹⁴ The picture that emerges from Herodotus' narrative is that—initially, at any rate—one state, Miletus, openly revolted from Persia: gradually, many other states—some Ionian, some not—staggered and stumbled into war, the rebellion particularly gaining momentum after the Sardis raid. But there was no common aim, no general objective: on the contrary, the states concerned, motivated no doubt by different considerations, seem to have felt free to join in as or when—even if—they wished, and to withdraw as, when, or if they wished.

Such a picture is a far cry from the cherished notions of the Ionian 'Revolt' as a democratic revolution of a united Ionia against the imperial might of Persia. Indeed, I find it hard to accept that any democratic revolution against Persia could have been launched by Aristagoras, whose first move was to enlist Persian aid with a view to attacking a democracy and establishing himself as tyrant there! Admittedly, the account Herodotus gives is strangely thin in detail: could we then accept a hypothesis that Herodotus deliberately excluded evidence in an attempt to belittle the 'Revolt'?

No irrefutable answer can ever be given to such a question, but I believe four strong arguments in favour of Herodotus' honesty can be adduced:

1. Herodotus is generally scrupulously impartial in his account of both nations and individuals. Despite the worst endeavours of his detractors to demonstrate bias—the 'proof' of which has even led scholars of the eminence of How and Wells and A. R. Burn to self-contradiction¹⁵—few charges can be made to stick:

¹⁴ Beloch (*GG* II ii (1916), 81 ff.) accepted the evidence of the Lindian Temple Chronicle as proving a siege of Lindos in 494, which must have been part of the Persian counter-measures to the 'Revolt'. Cary (*CAH* iv. 225) also accepted the earlier date; others (notably Meyer, *GdA* IV i (1916), 306 n. 1) prefer a later date of 490—dismissed by Burn (*Persia and the Greeks*, p. 218) as impossible. Hdt. himself seems to have had no authorities for the history of Rhodes: his three references (1.174, 2.178, and 7.153) tell us nothing about its history.

¹⁵ e.g. on 8.30: Wells (Introduct., p. 40 n. 1)

—'severe on Phocis', cf. How (ad loc.) 'this judicious remark', echoed by Hignett (*Xerxes' Invasion of Greece* (Oxford, 1963), p. 100) as 'this sensible observation'. A. R. Burn finds the same phrase 'wantonly catty' (Introduct. to Penguin translation, p. 33) but accepts without comment elsewhere (*Persia and the Greeks*, pp. 347, 425). In the same Introduction, Burn carefully establishes that Hdt. did not see various states as 'Goodies' and 'Baddies' (p. 15)—before going on to list which states Hdt. regarded as 'Goodies' and which as 'Baddies' (pp. 32 f.).

Herodotus did not see nations as 'Goodies and Baddies', to use Burn's phrase. Hence he includes about all states information good, bad, or indifferent quite impartially—as he admits, every nation has some skeletons in its cupboard (7.152.2)—and his attitude to Ionia conforms to this general pattern of careful disinterest.

2. While Herodotus does admit to omissions, such admissions are of minor significance: lists of names, alternative versions of stories, or irrelevant anecdotes.

3. We should, I believe, make far more allowance for the problems Herodotus faced in collecting material for his Histories. Some critical reaction to him seems to read as if the critic imagined Herodotus in a similar position to himself, being able to sit down with all the available information readily accessible all around him. If we start from the opposite hypothesis, that *no* material was readily available to him, and that all had to be collected from widely differing sources by the historian in person, then we are faced with an entirely different proposition. Herodotus himself makes frequent reference to his failure to acquire certain pieces of information which he had sought:¹⁶ in the specific case of Ionia, granted that we accept the disunity of the Ionian states (all of whom perhaps had their own version of the 'Revolt'), we should not be surprised to find (a) that there are some inconsistencies in Herodotus' account (e.g. the extent of collusion between Histiaeus and Aristagoras), and (b) that there are serious omissions of detail throughout the narrative of the 'Revolt'. I am aware that this is a subjective argument; I believe it to be tenable, in view of Herodotus' ubiquitously apparent honesty—unless we adopt the Plutarch line (*de mal., passim*) that he deliberately cultivated a charming style to conceal his inherent malevolence.

4. Herodotus' organization of his material is masterly. 'Up to 6.94, when the first invasion begins, the narrative seems almost entirely inconsequential . . . Yet, as we reach this point, we realise that we have been told everything that can be told about the vital earlier history of both Athens and Sparta: a history which has been inserted piecemeal in a series of apparently casual digressions.'¹⁷ The same phenomenon may be observed in the Ionian 'Revolt' narrative: the inadequacy of the account is not immediately apparent, and it is only when we try to rearrange the material to conform to modern historical practice that the gaps appear. The facts are scattered—on causes and course of the rebellion—but the narrative flows so smoothly that the impression the reader receives is that he has the salient features all presented. Such skilful presentation could be (as Plutarch believed) deliberately lulling the reader into a sense of false security. I would rather argue that it was designed to cover gaps in Herodotus' information: despite honest and assiduous efforts to do so, he could not answer every question, and covered the defects of his narrative in a most masterly fashion.

The overall impression which we gain from a careful scrutiny of the text of Herodotus is that the 'Ionian Revolt' was little more than a haphazard rebellion, with no effective degree of unity and no common aim. There was some discontent in Ionia with the Persian system of government (4.137.2), and at least some of the Ionians cherished *ἐλευθερίη* and resented Persian rule (e.g. the

¹⁶ e.g. 'I cannot discover', 1.47, 4.32, 187, 6.14, 7.26, 60, 8.87. Sometimes Hdt. admits ignorance but offers surmises (e.g. 4.87, 8.133, 9.81); sometimes he records his conjectures (stating them as such) without

explicit admissions to inability to discover facts (e.g. 7.185, 186, 187; 9.32).

¹⁷ W. G. Forrest: *Introd. to (abridged) Rawlinson translation* (Washington Square Press (1963), p. xxxi).

Milesians, 6.5; the Samians, on the other hand, are elsewhere (3.143.2) singled out as being less concerned!); these were indubitably factors which contributed to the hostilities. Yet, if for no other reason, we must beware of labelling these hostilities 'The Ionian Revolt', in that (a) not all the Ionian states can be shown to have participated at all, and none to have participated with any degree of unity and solidarity; and (b) other, non-Ionian states took part—again, with apparently no attempt at co-operation.

CONCLUSIONS

For Herodotus, there never was any such thing as an Ionian Revolt: all that happened was that two adventurers (neither of whom could be accepted as 'iustum ac tenacem propositi virum') precipitated haphazard hostilities against Persia, in which any state—not necessarily Ionian—joined battle or made peace quite independently of any other. It was just like any other of the struggles of Ionia with Persia—with one important difference, that in this particular instance assistance was given from mainland Greece (Sparta had almost done so once before, 1.77). This act of war by Greece against Persia undoubtedly contributed to Persian hostility culminating in the Persian invasions, but it would be wrong to assume (with Hignett¹⁸) that Herodotus saw the rebellion as 'directly responsible' for the invasions: Darius' decision to invade is reported much earlier.

Unless further evidence turns up to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that Herodotus was malignantly denigrating the Ionians in their national, patriotic bid for freedom from a harsh and despotic overlord, I would suggest that the more sober, less partisan view of Herodotus is infinitely preferable. Even were such evidence to appear, I believe we should still accord Herodotus credit for the breadth of his historical vision, in looking deeper than the immediate causes of this particular episode and seeing it as part of a pattern of East-West conflict.¹⁹

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¹⁸ Hignett, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

¹⁹ Some of the ideas in this article formed part of a thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham in 1976, and I must record my indebtedness to my tutors, Professor E. A.

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